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Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel
Good" Judicial Decision
INTRODUCTION
"Women are simply, by nature, not suited to handle complicat-
ed business affairs." Liz had repeatedly heard this from one
particular supervisor. Liz worked as a sales and promotions
representative for a small service-oriented firm. She had been
successful in all aspects of her life, at least until a few months
ago when she began to demonstrate the effects of the stress
caused by long-term discrimination in the workplace.
Since the new supervisor had arrived two years earlier, Liz
had endured the brunt of his gender-biased philosophy. At times
the discrimination took an overt form, such as the remark
above-at other times, the discrimination was more covert. Liz
was frequently denied the opportunity to develop business rela-
tionships with important customers, and important assignments
were usually given to male counterparts, who often had less
experience. This practice resulted in a decrease in sales commis-
sions for Liz. She twice complained about the behavior, but the
actions taken proved insufficient to deter the supervisor's con-
duct.
Liz began to have difficulty functioning at work, and the prob-
lems carried over into her home life. The job she once cherished
had become the source of medical disorders and marital dishar-
mony. Bills for the treatment of both the physical and psycholog-
ical signs of stress had accumulated.
When Liz could no longer tolerate this discriminatory work
environment, she met with an attorney and filed a gender dis-
crimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
After suit was filed, the firm became insolvent, leaving no assets
to satisfy any judgment against it. What can Liz do now? Surely
she can file a complaint against the supervisor who perpetrated
the reprehensible acts and collect from him-or maybe she can-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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not. Maybe she will have to cope without redress for the wrongs,
without compensation for the accumulated bills, and without a
sense that justice has been done.
This comment explores the issue of whether a supervisor can
be held liable, in an individual capacity, in a suit filed under
Title VII ("supervisor liability"). Section I presents the various
rationales relied on by courts when deciding this issue. Section
II further explores and analyzes the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "1964 Act") and the 1991 amend-
ments to the 1964 Act. Statutory interpretation is considered in
Section III, followed by an analysis and critique of the responde-
at superior and the deterrence arguments in Sections IV and V,
respectively. A case is made in support of the conclusion that
there is no supervisor liability under Title VII. The conclusion
draws on the hypothetical above and restates reasons that lead
to the conclusion that supervisor liability cannot be imposed.
SECTION I. THE REASONING OF THE COURTS
Supervisor liability under Title VII continues to be a dynamic
issue. As more federal circuit courts have addressed or read-
dressed the issue, confusion and uncertainty have resulted.2 In
2. The Fourth Circuit has struggled with the issue in the following cases:
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that a supervi-
sory person who exercises substantial control over hiring, firing, and conditions of
employment is an "employer" for Title VII purposes and can be held liable in an
individual capacity), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) and Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Co., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 & n.1 (4th Cir.)
(citing Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104) (concluding that there is no supervisor liability
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) by relying on Title VII cases for rationale, but noting that
an individual may not be shielded as an "agent" in all cases), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 666 (1994).
See also the following cases in the Fifth Circuit: Clanton v. Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a public official cannot
be held personally liable under Title VII), Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43
(5th Cir. 1986) (defining "employer" broadly to include supervisors, thereby imposing
personal liability and preventing discrimination by supervisors believing they operate
with impunity), Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 228 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (criticizing
Hamilton and noting that Clanton and Hamilton are inconsistent and that when two
panel opinions in the Fifth Circuit are in disagreement, the earlier decision, Clanton,
prevails), Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.) (declining to include
agents of the employer in both the employee and employer categories under Title
VI1 and therefore refusing to impose individual liability on natural persons under
the statute), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994) and Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing the facts of a case as
though supervisor liability is cognizable but citing Grant for the proposition that
individual capacity suits are not cognizable under Title VI1).
In the Tenth Circuit, the following line of cases has created confusion:
Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting suits
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the circuits that have yet to decide the issue, there is an
intracircuit split.' The conflict centers on the definition of "em-
against individuals in their individual capacity), Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d
477, 480 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying the Sauers rule) and Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d
664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995) (implying that there is individual liability, but declining to
decide what the panel states is an undecided issue in the Tenth Circuit (i.e. super-
visor liability under anti-discrimination statutes) while noting the indecision and con-
flicting opinions in other circuits).
Confusion in the Eleventh Circuit is evidenced by the following cases: Busby
v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Clanton, 649
F.2d at 1099 & n.19) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit is bound by cases decided
before October 1, 1981 in the former Fifth Circuit (Clanton was decided on July 6,
1981) and therefore the proper method by which to sue under Title VII is to name
individuals only as agents of the employer or to name the employer itself), Cross v.
Alabama, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1290, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1994) (allowing a
supervisor to be held individually liable, as an "employer," in a sexual harassment
suit), superseded on denial of rehearing, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995) and Smith v.
Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Busby, 931 F.2d at 772) (declin-
ing to impose Title VII supervisor liability).
3. The district courts in the First Circuit are in disagreement. See, e.g.,
Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, 889 F. Supp. 760, 765 (D. Vt. 1995) (allowing su-
pervisor liability under Title VII); Hernandez Torres v. Intercontinental Trading,
Ltd., Civ. No. 94-1057 (HL), 1994 WL 752591, at *4-*6 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 1994) (de-
clining to extend Title VII liability to individuals); Weeks v. Maine, 871 F. Supp.
515, 517 (D. Me. 1994) (permitting supervisor liability under Title VII); Douglas v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 855 F. Supp. 518, 520 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that supervisor
liability is imposed by Title VII).
The district courts in the Second Circuit are also divided on the issue. See
Bakal v. Ambassador Constr., No. 94 CIV. 584 (JSM), 1995 WL 447784, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995) (holding that "Title VII's remedies apply only to the actual
employer" and not to individual persons); Romand v. Zimmerman, 881 F. Supp. 806,
812 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (analogizing Title VII to the Americans with Disabilities Act
(the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. V 1993) and implying that no individual
liability would he in a Title VII action); Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., No. CV-94-
3731, 1995 WL 170095, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1995) (finding that individual lia-
bility is unavailable under anti-discrimination statutes); Archer v. Globe Motorist
Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging that under the
proper circumstances, such as when particular elements of proof are met or the
employer entity is undercapitalized, an individual may be liable); DeWald v. Amster-
dam Hous. Auth., 823 F. Supp. 94, 103 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that there is indi-
vidual liability under Title VII).
In the Third Circuit, see Hrosik v. Latrobe Steel Co., No. CIV.A.94-1361,
1995 WL 456212, at *5-*6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1995) (an ADA and ADEA case citing
and following Neiswonger v. Port Auth., Nos. 93-3399, 93-3503, 95-3520, slip op. at
10-19 & n.14 (3d Cir. Apr. 13, 1995), a non-precedential slip opinion that favored no
individual liability under Title VII for agents of unions (unions are defined under
Title VII in the same manner as employers-agency language is included in the
definition)), Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman and Kaskey, 882 F. Supp. 1529,
1532 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding no individual liability under Title VII), Dreisbach v.
Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing
that Title VII imposes individual liability on supervisors), Domm v. Jersey Printing
Co., 871 F. Supp. 732, 738 (D.N.J. 1994) (concluding that supervisors may be liable
in their individual capacities under Title VII), Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys.,
847 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (D.N.J. 1994) (agreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
that individual liability is not imposed by Title VII), Barb v. Miles Inc., 861 F.
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ployer," the issue of damages, jurisdictional questions, and the
deterrent purpose of Title VII.
A. The Definition of "Employer"--The Genesis of Conflict
The definition of "employer" in Title VII is the basis for the
dissension regarding supervisor liability. An "employer," for the
purposes of Title VII, is "a person engaged in an industry...
and any agent of such person."4 Some courts conclude that the
"agent" language in the definition simply codifies the principle of
respondeat superior' and allows supervisors to be named only in
their official capacities.6 Yet other courts advance the theory
that Congress included the agency language in order to assure
that not only would an employer entity be liable, but that super-
visory personnel who participated in the discrimination could be
defendants in their individual capacities as well.7 The search for
the intended definition leads to the murky waters of legislative
history.8
In Grant v. Lone Star Co.,' the Fifth Circuit interpreted the
definition of "employer" to exclude supervisors because Congress
did not expressly include individuals as it did in § 1983.10 The
Supp. 356, 359 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that supervisors and co-workers are not
individually liable under Title VII) and Randolph v. Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp.
518, 523 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (finding no individual liability for supervisors under Title
VII).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
5. Respondeat superior is a "doctrine . .. that [holds] a master . . . liable in
certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal [liable] for those
of his agent." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
6. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir.
1995) (involving an ADEA claim but analogizing to Title VII) (citation omitted);
Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck, 30
F.3d at 510 (ADEA case relying on Title VII cases for rationale) (citations omitted);
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1049 (1994).
7. See Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1995); Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d
27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
8. See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION §§ 45.05, 45.06, 45.08, 45.09 (1992 & 1995 Supp.) (discussing many of the prob-
lems encountered when courts attempt to utilize legislative intent and history to fa-
cilitate statutory construction and interpretation).
9. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
10. Grant, 21 F.3d at 653. Section 1983 provides as follows: "Every person
who, under color of [law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... per-
son . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities . . . shall be lia-
ble to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Paula Jo Grant ("Grant") was employed by the Lone Star Company for about
four and one-half years. Grant, 21 F.3d at 650. Mitchell Murray ("Murray"), one of
the defendants, had been the branch manager in Houston, where Grant worked, for
Vol. 34:351
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court noted that if Congress had intended to include supervisors,
in addition to employer entities, in the pool of potential Title VII
defendants, it could clearly have done so by including supervi-
sors in the list of potential defendants. The court reasoned
that because Congress specifically included individuals among
those to be held liable in other civil rights statutes, an absence
of such inclusion indicated an intent to exclude an individual as
a defendant under Title VII."
However, the Fourth Circuit opined in Paroline v. Unisys
Corp.," that the statutory definition of "employer," inclusive of
agency language, was an enumeration of liable parties, rather
than a codification of common law."' The only real issue in
Paroline was whether the defendant exercised sufficient control
over the claimant's working conditions, hiring, or termination, so
that the defendant could properly be classified as an "employer"
for Title VII purposes." Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit, in
Ball v. Renner," pointed out that respondeat superior liability
would have been clear without the addition of the agency lan-
guage and therefore the phrase must be attributed an additional
meaning. 7 The court claimed that it was clear that any organi-
zational employer could only act through its agents and that res-
pondeat superior liability would have been imposed even absent
Grant's last three and one-half years with the company. Id. After her resignation,
Grant sued multiple defendants alleging, among other things, gender discrimination,
sexual harassment, and maintenance of a hostile work environment. Id. at 651.
Murray was the only defendant found liable at a jury trial. Id.
11. Grant, 21 F.3d at 653.
12. Id. See generally SINGER, supra note 8, § 45.05 (discussing the role of leg-
islative intent in statutory interpretation).
13. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d
27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
14. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104. The plaintiff in Paroline alleged, among other
counts, sexual harassment. Id. at 102. The defendants included Unisys, the company
for which the plaintiff worked, and Edgar Moore ("Moore"), an employee of Unisys.
Id. The plaintiff claimed that Moore had a history of making "sexually suggestive
remarks" and making unwelcome physical contact with female employees. Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 104. Defendant Moore had taken part in the plaintiffs interview
and had recommended her for the job. Id. There was evidence that he had also, at
least one time, given the plaintiff her work assignments. Id. Because this raised a
genuine issue of material fact about Moore's ability to affect the plaintiffs working
conditions and his status as an "employer," the summary judgment granted by the
trial court was overturned. Id.
16. 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995).
17. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667. Sharon Ball ("Ball") had been a dispatcher for the
Cheyenne Police Department. Id. at 665. Ball claimed that David Renner ("Renner"),
a police sergeant, followed her home on several occasions and frequently made un-
wanted, and resisted, physical contact. Id. Ball did not appeal the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the City of Cheyenne, but did appeal the summary judg-
ment granted to Renner. Id. at 664.
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the agency language in the definition of "employer.""8 The addi-
tion of the agency language, the court reasoned, was sensibly
interpreted to include individuals as liable parties. 9
Circuit courts have looked to the same statutory definitional
language and have drawn divergent conclusions based solely
upon the language. It is clear that a simple reading of the stat-
ute may not be sufficient to determine whether there is supervi-
sor liability under Title VII. Courts have therefore found them-
selves exploring other sources of information and offering other
or additional rationale for their decisions regarding supervisor
liability.
B. Damages-Allowing Inferential Defendants
Original damages under Title VII, reinstatement and back
pay, were equitable damages available only from an employer
entity. The Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. AIC Security Investiga-
tions,2 reasoned that this type of. damage provision indicates
that the 78th Congress never intended to provide for supervisor
liability.' However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991
Act")23 amended the 1964 Act to allow for the award of compen-
satory and punitive damages.' The EEOC, in A!C, advanced
the argument that the addition of such damages, which could be
assessed against an individual, indicates a congressional intent
to include individual defendants as well.2" The Seventh Circuit
rebutted that assertion by noting that Congress, in the 1991 Act,
specifically limited the amount of non-pecuniary compensatory
and punitive damages according to the size of the employer
18. Id. at 667.
19. Id.
20. Title VII as originally passed provided only reinstatement and back pay
remedies. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988)).
21. 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
22. A/C, 55 F.3d at 1282 n.1. In A!C, Charles Wessel ("Wessel") and the
EEOC alleged that AIC Security Investigations ("AIC") had discharged Wessel in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"). Id. at 1279. Wessel was
terminally ill but maintained his full-time employment with AIC. Id. Wessel sued
AIC and Ruth Vrdolyak ("Vrdolyak"), the sole shareholder and operator of AIC. Id. A
jury awarded back pay, compensatory, and punitive damages against both defen-
dants. Id. In vacating the judgment against Vrdolyak, the court noted that as a sole
shareholder, she may still be held liable, by a pierce of the corporate veil, if the
company had insufficient funds with which to pay any judgment. Id. at 1282 n.ll.
23. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071,
1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)).
25. AIC, 55 F.3d at 1281.
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entity.2" Hence, the court concluded, it was Congress' intent to
hold only the actual employer liable.27
C. Jurisdictional Provisions
As originally enacted, the 1964 Act applied only to employers
with twenty-five or more employees.28 In 1972, the 1964 Act
was amended and statutory jurisdiction was expanded to include
employers with fifteen or more employees. 2' The 1972 amend-
ment was passed because Congress believed that employees of
smaller companies, as well as those of larger companies, should
be covered.3"
The present jurisdictional provision of Title VII limits applica-
bility to employers with fifteen or more employees. 1 Several
courts contend that the exclusion of smaller companies indicates
Congress' desire not to burden small businesses with Title VII
litigation; therefore, it is incongruous to believe that Congress
could have intended to burden individuals. 2
26. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993) (establishing damage caps
according to the number of persons employed by any particular employer). The AIC
court relied on Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994), an oft-cited Ninth Circuit case which dealt with su-
pervisor liability under Title VII and the ADEA. A!C, 55 F.3d at 1281. The dissent
in Miller made much the same argument as the EEOC in AC, that the addition of
these damages possibly indicated a congressional intent to validate supervisor liabili-
ty. Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The majority responded to this
claim with the logic adopted by the Seventh Circuit in AIC. Id. at 587-88 & n.2.
27. A/C, 55 F.3d at 1281. The Seventh Circuit refused to accept the appellees'
contention that the caps imposed indicate a congressional intent to limit damages
paid by the employer entity, but to allow unlimited damages to be assessed against
an individual. Id. at 1281 n.6.
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241,
253 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988)).
29. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2,
86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988)).
30. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155. The House originally proposed that the jurisdictional num-
ber of employees be decreased to eight. Id. Ultimately, the House and Senate com-
promise decreased the number to fifteen; the decreased jurisdictional requirement
was to become effective one year after the bill passed. See H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 92-
899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
31. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b) (1988).
32. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted); Birkbeck v Marvel Lighting Co., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994) (citations omitted); Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc.,
991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
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D. Deterrence
In Hamilton v. Rodgers,33 the Fifth Circuit imposed supervi-
sor liability to assure that supervisors would not be led to be-
lieve that they could discriminate with impunity.' The Fifth
Circuit again noted in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America"
that it is necessary to "hold liable those with power over the pla-
intiff which exceeds that of mere coworkers [sic]."36 Other cir-
cuits have responded to this argument by noting that employer
liability will sufficiently deter individual conduct.37 Employers
suffering the costs of liability will discipline the responsible em-
ployees appropriately, thereby fulfilling the deterrent purpose of
Title VII.3
33. 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986).
34. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443. James Hamilton's ("Hamilton") Title VII claim
alleged racial discrimination by his supervisors. ld. at 441. Hamilton was a radio
technician for the Houston Fire Department. Id. Hamilton's immediate supervisors
were found individually liable under Title VII because they ignored the racist activi-
ties of other workers and because they themselves had refused to assist Hamilton in
honing his skills because of his race. Id. at 442. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the joint
and several liability of the Houston Fire Department and Hamilton's immediate
supervisors under Title VII. Id. at 445.
35. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
36. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451. See also Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443. Freddy Garcia
("Garcia"), a male employee, alleged sexual harassment under Title VII. Garcia, 28
F.3d at 448. He filed suit against his employer and two individuals, including Locke,
the male foreman whom Garcia accused of the harassment. Id. Mowell, the other
individual defendant, was a plant manager. Id. Both worked at the Seagraves, Texas
plant of Ozark Mahoney Company, where Garcia was employed. Id. Garcia filed an
EEOC charge and then a Title VII complaint against the defendants. Id. at 448-49.
The Fifth Circuit upheld a summary judgment for Locke, stating that Locke was not
Garcia's supervisor. Id. at 451. The court added that a harassment suit brought by
a male employee against a male employer was not cognizable. Id. at 451-52. The
court also upheld a summary judgment for Mowell since Mowell had taken proper
measures to end the harassment. Id. at 451. The court presented an analysis of pri-
or cases and analyzed the factual pattern in this case as though supervisor liability
was cognizable under Title VII. Id. at 451-52. However, the court also noted another
Fifth Circuit decision that "Title VII liability does not attach to individuals in their
individual capacity" and stated that the present suit must have been brought
against Mowell and Locke in their official capacities. Id. at 451 n.2 (citing Grant v.
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994)).
37. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir.
1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); Mill-
er v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1049 (1994).
38. See AIC, 55 F.3d at 1282; Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 381; Miller, 991 F.2d at
588.
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E. Interference With Employer Functions
Economic theory, pervasive in so many areas of legal analysis,
is raised as well during the analysis of the imposition of supervi-
sor liability. The economic concept of efficiency has been prof-
fered as yet another impetus for the denial of supervisor liabili-
ty.
In Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co.," the District Court
for the Southern District of New York discussed congressional
action that indicated a concern, relative to the public sector, for
the ability of businesses to function." The court noted that
Congress had passed a statute limiting the individual liability of
employees of the government in order to facilitate "the ability of
the entity to perform its functions."4' The court then reasoned
that the same chilling effect was of concern in the private sec-
tor.42 Excessive concerns with liability, the court noted, could
lead to impaired efficiency.43
39. 833 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
40. Archer, 833 F. Supp. at 214.
41. Id. The pertinent part of the statute referenced by the court, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)(1), states:
The remedy against the United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or pro-
ceeding . . . by reason of the same subject matter against the employee . . .
or against the estate of such employee . . . . Any other civil action or proceed-
ing . . . arising out of or related to the same subject matter against the em-
ployee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or
omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988).
The court noted that the legislative history of the statute indicated Congress'
concern that individual liability of federal employees "could lead to a substantial
diminution in the vigor of Federal law enforcement and implementation." Archer, 833
F. Supp. at 214 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947). Because it was also a concern that not punishing
misconduct could impair "law enforcement under Title VII and the ADEA," the court
allowed that "adequate specific allegations . . . of individualized personal misconduct"
or evidence to pierce the corporate veil could possibly provide a means to hold an
individual owner or supervisor liable. Id. The court did not state what would qualify
as "adequate specific allegations" -but did refer to a case concerning individual
liability under environmental law. Id. at 214 n.1 (citing Barnes Landfill v. Town of
Highland, 802 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). The criteria set forth in Barnes are
not very helpful to a Title VII claimant because Barnes did not involve an employ-
ment claim but rather was a private party claim for environmental clean-up costs.
See Barnes, 802 F. Supp. at 1088.
42. Archer, 833 F. Supp. at 214.
43. Id. See also Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (utilizing the same reasoning as in Archer, the public sector statute
and concerns with "chilling," to decide against individual liability). Bramesco and
Archer were both decided by District Judge Vincent L. Broderick. See Bramesco, 834
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The definition of "employer," the implications of a punitive
and compensatory damages amendment, the jurisdictional provi-
sion, and the deterrent and employer function arguments are
the primary issues considered by courts when deliberating
whether to impose supervisor liability. Each of the arguments
seeks to identify exactly which defendants can properly be in-
cluded in a Title VII intentional discrimination case. Viewing an
argument in isolation can definitively compel a reader to firmly
conclude that supervisor liability is imposed by Title VII. How-
ever, taken as a whole, and in conjunction with legislative histo-
ry and other issues discussed below, the arguments compel only
one conclusion-there is no supervisor liability under Title VII.
SECTION II. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-THE 1964 AND
1991 ACTS
A. The 1964 Act
While congressional intent is at most a tenuous argument of
last resort, it is even more tenuous in the context of Title VII."
The legislative history of the 1964 Act is scattered throughout
the Congressional Record.4" There was only one official commit-
F. Supp. at 121; Archer, 833 F. Supp. at 213.
44. The use of legislative history to interpret statutes did not escape the at-
tention of the Senate during debates. Senator Hart noted that legislative history, in
the form of a committee report filed by a majority of a committee, would be no
more helpful than Choctaw (an Indian language) to a judge interpreting the statute.
110 CONG. REC. 6441 (1964). Noting that the House had already managed to create
massive history for the bill, the Senator suggested that the courts could better inter-
pret the statute by "applying the canon of construction . . . [that] when the legis-
lative history is doubtful, go to the statute." Id. (quoting Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956)).
Senator Dirksen, discussing the possibility of sending the bill to committee,
quoted an uncited Harvard Law Journal article which began with these two sentenc-
es: "The intent of Congress is a fiction. The intent of Congress is what the courts
say it is." 110 CONG. REc. 6445 (1964).
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION 16-23 (1994) (discussing a legislative intent analysis of Title VII insofar as
affirmative action is concerned and detailing the problems with utilizing such an
analysis).
45. The House debated the bill in an orderly fashion, title by title, accepting
proposed amendments to each title and revising each title at that time. See 110
CONG. REC. 1511, 1582, 1677, 1899, 1961, 2250, 2462, 2548, 2705, 2803. There are
few entries in the Congressional Record Index for House Remarks but each entry
contains numerous pages of debate and discussion. See 110 CONG. REC. Index 119.
Alternatively, the Senate never sent the entire bill to committee. Rather, it
debated the bill on the floor. As a result, the Senate debates are much less coherent
and organized. The debates are more scattered-there are approximately 224 entries
for Senate remarks on the 1964 Act in the Index to the 110th Volume of the Con-
gressional Record. See 110 CONG. REC. Index 119.
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tee report"6 which addressed Title VII. 7 The issue of supervi-
sor liability was not discussed in either the committee report or
during floor debates." Even a cursory review of the Title VII
debates in the House and Senate reveals the often hostile atti-
tude toward the proposed legislation. 9 It is difficult to accept
that if supervisor liability had been intended, it would not have
been discussed once. Rather, it is likely that it would not only
have been discussed, but would have been a wellspring of vehe-
ment opposition.
The House Report notes that the purpose of the 1964 Act was
to establish a Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion to eliminate employment discrimination which was being
practiced by businesses, labor unions, and employment agen-
cies." This statement specifically addresses entities and not
individuals. The report later summarizes the definition of "em-
ployer" without mentioning the agency language." Such an
omission does not support the tremendous weight attributed to
the agency language by those courts that find that supervisor
liability was intended.
Section 709(c) of the 1964 Act makes an employer responsible
for keeping certain records regarding its employment practic-
es.52 Section 711(a) imposes on an employer the duty to post
46. See H.R. REP. No. 914, .88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.CAN. 2391. The report was completed by the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary.
47. The Senate Report addressed only S. 1732, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). S.
1732 dealt only with discrimination in places of public accommodation. See S. REP.
No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355.
48. Opponents frequently questioned the constitutionality of the 1964 Act. See
110 CONG. REC. 1511, 1620, 2603, 2612, 7051. Much of the discussion was a general
debate on the need for anti-discrimination legislation.
49. For a summary of amendments proposed during the House discussions, see
110 CONG. REc. 2548-2616, 2705-53. The suggested amendments included the
Landrum amendment to strike Title VII in its entirety. 110 CONG. REC. 2599.
The Senate's proposed amendments are summarized at 110 CONG. REC.
14,460-62 and demonstrate a profound dislike of Title VII.
Senator Clark noted that the subject of fair employment practices legislation
had been a topic of discussion and study for twenty years and tallied the pages of
testimony in previously held hearings. 110 CONG. REC. 7204.
The Senate noted that Title VII had not been included in the prior proposals
by President Kennedy. Id. at 2603, 9123, 9587.
50. H.R. REP. NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402.
51. Id.
52. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(c), 78 Stat. 241, 263
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1988)). Section 709(c) states, in pertinent
part:
Except as provided ... every employer .. subject to this title shall (1)
make and keep such records relevant to the determinations of whether unlaw-
1996
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notices, and § 711(b) provides a penalty for failure to do so.53 If
"employer" is given a consistent meaning throughout the stat-
ute,' and that meaning is inclusive of supervisors, the statute
is nonsensical." A supervisor, as an individual, clearly cannot be
held responsible for keeping records detailing the employment
practices of the entity for which the supervisor works, or for
posting notices on the employer's premises. Though it is argu-
able that "employers" and "agents" (or supervisors) are two sepa-
rate persons, and that posting and record-keeping provisions
apply only to the employer itself, that argument is contra to the
theory relied upon by parties seeking to hold supervisors liable
under Title VII. Those parties rely entirely upon the agency
language in the definition of "employer" and argue that the word
"employer," as used throughout the statute, encompasses agents
and supervisors.
During the course of congressional discussion, supervisor
liability was neither discussed by the presenters nor by the
opponents of the legislation. More specifically, supervisor liabili-
ty was not discussed at the times when it would have been ap-
propriate to address the issue. For example, Senators Tower and
Talmadge had a fairly lengthy discourse concerning the financial
ful employment practices have been or are being committed, (2) preserve such
records for such periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom, as the [Equal
Opportunity Employment] Commission shall prescribe by regulation or or-
der .... The Commission shall, by regulation, require each employer...
subject to this title which controls an apprenticeship or other training program
to maintain such records as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose
of this title, including, but not limited to, a list of applicants who wish to
participate in such program, including the chronological order in which such
applications were received, and shall furnish to the Commission, upon request,
a detailed description of the manner in which persons are selected to partici-
pate ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 709(c), 78 Stat. 241, 263 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 200e-8(c) (1988)).
53. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 711(a)-(b), 78 Stat. 241,
265 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1988)). Sections 711(a) and (b) state in
pertinent part:
(a) Every employer . . . shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon
its premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, and mem-
bers are customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by the Com-
mission setting forth excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions
of this title and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
(b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more
than $100 for each separate offense.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 711(a)-(b), 78 Stat. 241, 265 (cur-
rent version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (1988)).
54. See generally SINGER, supra note 8, § 46.05 (discussing interpretation of
statutes "so as to produce a harmonious whole.").
55. See generally id. § 45.12 (explaining the need to interpret a statute in a
manner that produces a reasonable meaning).
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burden that Title VII would place on an employer, yet neither
addressed the onerous burden of supervisor liability on an indi-
vidual.5 6 Senator Stennis addressed the cost to large business-
es, and the crippling effect on small businesses, but he never ad-
dressed the cost that Title VII would impose on an individual
supervisor." Senator Stennis lamented the impact on "small
businessmen.""8 Supervisors are not necessarily business-per-
sons. A supervisor could be an unskilled and uneducated worker
in a supervisory position solely because of seniority. It is reason-
able to assume that if Senator Stennis had any idea that super-
visor liability would arise from the 1964 Act, he would have
championed the cause of the individual as well.
Senator Hill articulated his concern that any "group" having
the statutorily required number of employees would be affected,
and that this, therefore, included not only businesses in the
traditional sense but co-ops and farms, thereby permitting the
government to intervene in all aspects of those "businesses" as
well. 9 Senator Russell, who followed Senator Hill, expressed
concern over the already interventionist policies of the federal
government where such non-traditional businesses were con-
cerned." It is indeed curious that two Senators so concerned
about the liability of non-traditional businesses and governmen-
tal intervention into such businesses would not voice concern
about supervisor liability and governmental intervention at such
a personal level. Senator Fulbright noted that perhaps large
businesses could survive the bill but that small businesses, the
life blood of his state, could not."' Senator Fulbright surely
would have contemplated the ability of an individual, a constitu-
ent in his state, to bear the burden as well.
Several times during the discussions the term "employer" was
clearly used solely in the sense of a business entity or a business
owner. Senator Hill addressed the right of a person to establish
a business and the right of that person to "make decisions which
vitally affect his business."62 A supervisor does not usually own
a business. Senator Tower attributed to "employers" the power
to increase or decrease their workforce. 3 A supervisor simply
does not have such power. The Senators who discussed and
56. See 110 CONG. REC. 9024-27 (1964).
57. See id. at 8311.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 8443.
60. Id.
61. 110 CONG. REC. 9593 (1964).
62. Id. at 7014.
63. Id. at 7777.
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debated the bill spoke of an "employer" as a business entity or
business owner. They did not speak of a business entity or any-
one who happened to be working as the entity's agent in a su-
pervisory capacity."
The Congressional Record excerpts in which damages and
remedies are discussed never affirmatively indicate that an
individual supervisor might incur liability. 5 They need not do
so because a supervisor can quite clearly not provide the equita-
ble relief of reinstatement.
Furthermore, there are numerical estimates of the number of
employers to be affected by the 1964 Act that were set forth at
different points during presentation and debate.66 It is some-
what incredible to suggest that the statistics that reflected the
number of "employers" affected included not only entities and
owners, but every supervisor as well. Such a suggestion would
imply that Congress was omniscient about the management
structure of many businesses and could account for the very last
person in those businesses who would qualify as a supervisor for
Title VII liability purposes.
There are two points during debate when the non-specificity of
the definition of "employer" was raised. The ensuing discussion
is helpful only in that supervisor liability is never mentioned,
perhaps implying that it was never intended. Senator Dirksen
suggested that the present definition was not specific enough. 7
The question was raised once more in Senator Clark's response
to the Dirksen Memorandum." The term "employer," the re-
64. See id. at 1620, 2603, 2605, 2737, 8443, 9587, 9593.
65. Id. at 2612, 2737, 7386, 9159.
66. The following is noted in the Record: "[I]n the first year it would af-
fect . .. 56,000 employers; in the second year .. . 116,000 employers; and thereaf-
ter . . .259,000 employers." 110 CONG. REC. 7777 (1964).
The Record also reflects that 75% to 80% of all employers would be exempt
under the provisions. Id. at 9123.
Finally, in the summary of the variances between the House and Senate
versions, one dissimilarity mentioned was the number of covered employers. Id. at
12,596.
67. 110 CONG. REc. 6450 (1964). At the time of the discussion, "employer" was
defined numerically but was not as specific as the definition utilized in the Fair
Employment Practice Act (the "FEPA") cited by the Senator. Id. (citation omitted).
The FEPA defined the number of employees required for applicability by a particular
number of employees who were required to be employed for a specific amount of
weeks in any calendar year, thereby accounting for seasonal and transient employ-
ment situations. See id. At the time that Senator Dirksen questioned the Title VII
definition, "employer" was defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 25 or more employees." Id.
68. The Dirksen Memorandum was a written document expressing concerns
and asking questions about particular parts of the bill. The memorandum was read
in its entirety, with a response, into the Congressional Record. Id. at 7216.
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sponse states, is to have its ordinary dictionary meaning.69 This
offer of dictionary meaning is not a talisman to be used during a
discussion of supervisor liability since Title VII proffers, and the
issue of supervisor liability deals with, a statutory definition.7"
The Congress responsible for enacting the 1964 Act would not
have ignored the topic of supervisor liability, and would not have
so frequently used the word "employer" in the context it did if
the members believed that they were passing an act which codi-
fied supervisor liability.
B. The 1991 Act
The 102d Congress, like the 78th Congress, did not leave a
trail of legislative history indicating an intent to incorporate
supervisor liability. There was no Senate Report regarding the
1991 Act.71 The House Report (the "Report") indicated that the
purpose of the 1991 Act was to provide monetary remedies in
cases of intentional discrimination, to increase the effectiveness
of the prior provisions by increasing deterrence, to restore feder-
al protection against discrimination, and to respond to a number
of Supreme Court decisions which limited the scope of the 1964
Act.72 The intent to conform the remedies of the 1964 Act to
those provided in other civil rights statutes73 does not reflect an
intent to conform the defendants available when filing suit as
well.' The Report specifically notes that monetary damages
69. Id. at 7216.
70. See generally SINGER, supra note 8, § 47.07 (discussing the utilization of
statutory definitions over ordinary or dictionary meaning).
71. 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. This is similar to the 1964 legislative history. See
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reports that were
available to provide legislative history for the 1964 Act.
72. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N 549, 552. Congress enacted the 1991 Act as a response to nine
disfavored Supreme Court cases. Perhaps there would be a similar response to a
Supreme Court decision on the supervisor liability issue. Of course, the present Con-
gress is politically different than the Congress responsible for the 1991 Act and
those who await an angry response to a holding of no liability might have a long
wait.
73. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I) at 64, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N at 602-
03. Section 1981, which permits actions against "persons" in the case of intentional
race discrimination, was specifically mentioned in the report. See id. The report
noted: "It is the Committee's intention that damages should be awarded under Title
VII in the same circumstances in which such awards are now permitted under
U.S.C. § 1981 in intentional race discrimination cases .... By contrast [to Title
VII] . . .§ 1981 authorizes courts to award . . . compensatory . . .and . . .punitive
damages." Id.
74. See supra note 10 for the relevant text of § 1983, which indicates that all
"persons" are liable.
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would increase the cost of engaging in intentional discrimination
and "provide employers with additional incentives to prevent
intentional discrimination in the workplace before it hap-
pens." 5 Such preventative measures cannot, in the normal and
usual course of business, be taken by a supervisor. Indeed, an
excerpt from the hearings included in the Report addresses the
incentive to implement internal controls and increase preven-
tative measures." This type of planning and prevention is a
company prerogative and not a supervisory prerogative.
In discussing punitive damages, the Report noted that it was
appropriate that a higher amount be assessed against a larger
or wealthier employer.77 Obviously, the wealth or size of an em-
ployer has no correlation to the wealth of its supervisors.78 The
punitive damages permitted in a supervisor liability case would
bear no relationship to the wealth of the supervisor, in contra-
vention of Congress' intent to impose meaningful punitive dam-
ages. Imagine that a housekeeping supervisor employed by Gen-
eral Electric could be liable for higher damages than a vice-pres-
ident of a small company or the owner of a corner grocery store.
This is repugnant to one's sense of logic and sensibility, and
leads only to incredulity. By using the size of the employer as
the benchmark for punitive damages, Congress demonstrated its
belief that only employer entities and actual business owners
would be paying such damages.
If the 102d Congress had intended to add supervisor liability,
it could have clearly stated its intent to do so. It is a stretch of
the interpretive imagination to intimate that by adding certain
remedies and damages, Congress intended to add additional
defendants. It is the job of Congress to clearly enunciate the
principles it codifies. If Congress intended to impose supervisor
liability, or believed that such liability already existed, it was
antithetical to place caps on damages according to the size of the
employer. The legislative history of both the 1964 Act and the
75. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I) at 65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 603.
76. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N at 607 (citing Hearings on H.R.
4000, the Civil Rights Act of 1990, Before the House Committee on Education and
Labor and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. Vols. 1-3, Vol. 2 at 180-81 (testimony of William Burns on
behalf of Pacific Gas & Electric)).
77. Id. at 73, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 611.
78. It is true that the number of employees employed by one entity at any
time does not necessarily reflect the financial situation of the entity. There are per-
haps better indicators of employer wealth. However, it is likely true that the num-
ber of employees bears a closer relationship to the wealth of the entity than it does
to the wealth the supervisors whom the entity employs.
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1991 Act is not indicative of an intent to codify supervisor liabil-
ity.
SECTION III. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION-INTERPRETATION BUT
NOT CREATION
It is true that liberal interpretation 9 is generally a rule of
construction applied to statutes such as Title VII." Still, other
rules of statutory construction apply as well. Though the statute
was originally remedial, offering only reinstatement and back
pay, the 1991 Act allows for awards of punitive damages, thus
adding a penal aspect l to Title VII.82 The interpretation of
such a statute necessarily entails different rules of statutory
construction than those applied to purely remedial statutes."
Courts should not construe a penal statute, or the penal provi-
sions of a statute, to include defendants not clearly contemplated
or enumerated. Liberal interpretation does not mandate an
interpretation that would, if attributing the same meaning to
"employer" throughout the Title, give ridiculous meaning to
portions of Title VII. If "employer" is to be read consistently
throughout the Title, the inclusion of supervisors as "employers"
would impose on supervisors the duty to post notice and keep
79. Liberal interpretation or construction "expands the meaning of the statute
to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law . . .. It
means, not that the words should be forced out of their natural meaning, but simply
that they should receive a fair and reasonable interpretation with respect to the ob-
jects and purposes of the instrument." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 313 (6th ed. 1990).
80. See generally 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 60.01 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the liberal interpretation of remedial stat-
utes); 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 74.05, 74.08
(1992 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the liberal interpretation of Civil Rights statutes
and employment statutes, respectively).
81. The suggestion that Title VII has a penal aspect is not in any way meant
to imply that it is criminal in nature. A penal action "refers to a civil action in
which a wrongdoer is subject to a fine or penalty payable to the aggrieved party
(e.g. punitive damages)." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1132 (6th ed. 1990).
82. See generally 3 SINGER, supra note 80, § 60.03 (distinguishing remedial
and penal statutes, and including those statutes which provide for remedies in ex-
cess of actual damages (i.e. punitive damages) in the penal category). In 1991, the
House Committee on Education and Labor, the committee that reviewed proposed
amendments to the 1964 Act, proposed an amendment that would have codified the
rule of liberal construction. See H.R. REP. NO. 10240(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 88,
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 626. It is interesting to note that this proposal
was not included in the 1991 Act as passed. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 88, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 626 with Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29 and
42 U.S.C.).
83. See generally 3 SINGER, supra note 80, § 60.04 (addressing the rules of
interpretation for statutes that provide both remedy and punishment).
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the required records.
Liberal interpretation does not allow the judicial creation of a
cause of action against a particular defendant where none ex-
ists.8" A liberal reading does not mean that courts should im-
pose liability on any defendant who has committed a social evil.
In the absence of authority to act, courts should refrain from the
application of what they believe the law should be, and refuse to
be a vehicle for the imposition of purely moral blame."6
SECTION IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR CODIFIED
The agency language in the definition of "employer" need
not necessarily be given a meaning beyond that of agency itself.
Congress may have clearly stated the principle of respondeat
superior to prevent employers from placing absolute and com-
plete blame on supervisors as a method of liability evasion. 7 If
Congress had intended to impose supervisor liability, it could
have done so with lucidity by listing supervisors as among the
persons liable. It is certainly less logical to expect, and less cred-
ible to suggest, that supervisor liability would or should be in-
corporated through a statutory definition.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson," noted that the agency provision was a codification of
84. See supra notes 52-53 for the statutory text imposing such requirements.
85. See generally 3 SINGER, supra note 80, § 58.05 (stating that liberal inter-
pretation does not support "judicial creation of right[s] or liabilities" under the um-
brella of "construction").
86. See Bakal v. Ambassador Constr., No. 94 Civ. 584 (JSM), 1995 WL
447784, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995).
87. Considering the situation in the southern United States in 1964 with re-
gard to racial discrimination, it cannot be said that such a concern would be invalid.
The social climate, and often the judicial climate, was not one receptive to forced
equality. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (forcing the
integration of public schools) ("Brown I"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (mandating implementation of desegregation plans in a more speedy fashion
after recognizing the reluctance of voluntary compliance with Brown 1); Holmes v.
Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.) (recognizing the unlawful segregation practiced by a
public golf course but refusing to issue an injunction mandating the course to admit
African-Americans), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Dawson v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.) (reversing a district court decision to dismiss an action
seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the use of state authori-
ties to enforce segregation at public beaches), affd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
The social and judicial atmosphere throughout the country, and particularly
in the south, was an atmosphere that could have generated concern about the inter-
pretation of Title VII, thereby leading to the inclusion of the agency clause in the
definition of "employer." See generally MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND
SOUTHERN ORDER (1987) (describing racial violence, administrative policy, and the
lack of justice in the southern courts primarily in the 1950's and 1960's).
88. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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respondeat superior.8 9 The Court considered at what point an
employer can be held liable in a sexual harassment suit when
that employer did not have actual knowledge of harassment by a
fellow employee. While declining to issue a bright line rule on
employer liability in such cases, the Court did address the statu-
tory definition of "employer."9 The Meritor Court suggested
that the agency language was included in the definition to offer
guidance to courts.2 It was Congress' desire, the Court opined,
that courts be guided by agency principles when imposing Title
VII liability.9" The Court viewed the agency language as a
phrase which narrowed the cases in which an employer entity
could be liable, rather than one which expanded the actual pool
of defendants.9 The agency language, the Court stated, was to
assure that an employer would not be held liable for each and
every act of each of its employees.95
Although the Court's conclusion regarding the agency lan-
guage in the definition of "employer" was in a context distin-
guishable from supervisor liability, it remains a formidable con-
clusion to the proponents of supervisor liability. The Court did
not circuitously address the meaning of the language; rather, it
clearly determined that the clause is a statutory codification of
the common law and relied on that determination when conclud-
ing that the circuit court was incorrect in the imposition of strict
liability on employers for the actions of their supervisors.96
Those who espouse supervisor liability have no similar precise
statement from so high an authority, whether or not in the dis-
tinct context of supervisor liability.
89. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
90. Id. at 69-72.
91. Id. at 72.
92. Id.
93. Id. The Court was in agreement with the EEOC that inclusion of agency
language in the definition was to direct courts to utilize agency principles. Id.
94. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
95. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that the agency
language "surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id.
96. Id. The primary holding in the case was that a cause of action for gender
discrimination in the form of hostile environment sexual harassment is cognizable
under Title VII. Id. at 73. The Court also decided issues of evidence in the case. Id.




SECTION V. DETERRENCE-A PARADE OF HORRIBLES THAT WILL
NEVER COME TO BE
If everyone is held liable in a court of law for each of their
transgressions, deterrence would be at its zenith." This "omni-
liability" is not practical. Omni-liability is not an economical
approach to deterrence because the returns (measure of deter-
rence achieved) at the margin (when the last punishment is im-
posed for the smallest of infractions) would prove very costly to
courts. 8 The same result can often be achieved by imposing
indirect liability. Such indirect liability is less costly to courts
because legal liability is imposed on only one or two actors. This
scheme relies upon the private sector to disburse punishment to
each individual who was at fault.
Liability need not be in the form of monetary damages. Mone-
tary damages compensate a claimant, but there are many ways
to deter a potential defendant or an actual wrongdoer. Deter-
rence can be accomplished by indirect methods, similar to the
practice of making parents pay for property damage done by
their children. The deterrent effect is not foregone because the
children did not pay with their own money. Society relies upon
the parent-child relationship and counts on the parent to impose
appropriate punishment on the child. In passing Title VII, Con-
gress relied on the employer-employee relationship. Though
admittedly an employer-employee relationship is not on the
same moral footing as the parent-child relationship in which the
parent is charged with the moral upbringing of the child, an
employer can still affect the behavior of an employee in a man-
ner to encourage a higher morality (at least in the workplace).
Congress rightfully relied upon and placed its faith in the notion
that an employee who commits a wrongful act for which the
employer suffers pecuniary loss would be appropriately disci-
plined by that employer.
Congressional reliance on the employer-employee relationship
is logically based upon economics. Businesses generally function
97. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that increased accountability 'will increase deterrence but rejecting that argu-
ment as insufficient in the context of supervisor liability).
98. One could argue that this would be costly to society as well; however, so-
cietal cost raises economic theory beyond the scope of this paper. Societal cost may
necessarily include costs incurred by private as well as by public entities, since it is
arguable that society incurs costs, in the form of foregone employment, when busi-
nesses must expend funds other than in product or service development or distri-
bution. See generally DOUGLAS F. GREER, BuSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIETY 406-
16 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing some of the "private," or societal, costs incurred when
governmental intervention occurs in the form of business regulation).
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with a profit motive. No economic benefit is derived from the
money paid in settlement of a Title VII claim. In addition, the
reputation of a business, its goodwill, might be tarnished if a
Title VII suit is publicized. It is difficult to imagine that there
would be no disciplinary action and that the supervisor responsi-
ble for the acts which were the basis for the suit would suffer no
repercussions. More realistically, the supervisor would no longer
have a means through which to earn a living. Of course, the
supervisor can go elsewhere. The problem is that many supervi-
sors do not possess skills that make them highly marketable and
place them in great demand in the labor market. There would be
little demand for a convenience store shift-supervisor, armed
with a high school diploma, who caused a company to pay out a
five or six digit settlement in a Title VII case. A supervisor's
personnel record would reflect disciplinary action or termination
and the circumstances surrounding those actions. This informa-
tion would likely be disseminated in an interview or during a
reference check if the employee sought other employment. The
information would thus affect the final decision of a potential
employer. 9  Therefore, the deterrent effect does trickle
down.'
Deterrence entails the visiting of punishment on those who
have committed wrongful acts. The desired effect is that the
individual punished and others aware of the punishment will be
intimidated to the point of conforming their behavior to that
dictated by law. More importantly, Title VII deterrence should
encourage the formulation of proactive employment policies,
practices, and procedures. Such a preventative scheme is a re-
flection of company policy which supervisors do not formulate
and to which the supervisors may not even be invited to contrib-
ute. Deterrence is most effective at an owner/entity level.
CONCLUSION
Most people agree that discrimination is reprehensible and
morally wrong, and most realize that it is unlawful. The factual
99. It is possible that if a potential employer believed that the applicant
would never repeat the acts for which the previous employer was held liable, the
potential employer would hire the applicant. Unless the applicant has invaluable
talents, the potential employer is unlikely to gamble on the applicant's future behav-
ior when it can hire an equally qualified candidate without a jaded history.
100. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir.
1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Technology, 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); Mill-




patterns of the cases arising under Title VII are enough to stir
societal ire. Those who suffer from workplace discrimination
might rest better if they knew that not only the employer, but
the actual perpetrator, had paid for the damage done.
However, these beliefs and emotions should not be enough to
supplant a reasonable reading of a statute and provoke courts to
disregard the statute's legislative history. Justice, as in Liz' hy-
pothetical case, is not always the end product of the judicial
system. But then, what occurs in the judicial system, at least
insofar as the enforcement of statutory rights, is largely a prod-
uct of the legislative system. In turn, the legislative system is
the product of politics and debate about competing interests.
Ultimately, the legislative system involves a compromise of some
interests in order that others might be preserved. Better a Title
VII without supervisor liability than no Title VII at all.
A statute is to be accorded a meaning that makes sense, not
necessarily a meaning that makes one victim, or even thousands
of victims, feel better and be better compensated for their inju-
ries. The only sensible interpretation of Title VII is that it im-
poses liability upon an employer for the actions of its agents
under respondeat superior, but that it does not impose individu-
al capacity liability on supervisors.
Clara J. Montanari
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